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Abstract  
 
We examine the impacts of British government ‘stop-go’ policy on domestic sales of 
consumer durables over 1952 – 1965, via hire purchase restrictions and punitive 
Purchase Tax rates. Our analysis includes a general review of contemporary evidence 
regarding the impacts of these measures, a more detailed study of the television sector, 
and time-series econometric analysis for both televisions and a representative high-
ticket labour-saving consumer durable –washing machines. We find that the restrictions 
had devastating impacts on Britain’s consumer durables industries, preventing firms 
from fully exploiting economies of scale, reducing output growth and international 
competitiveness, and eroding industrial relations. Government officials were aware of 
these problems, but considered them a price worth paying to facilitate moves towards 
sterling convertibility and the re-establishment of the City as a leading financial and 
trading centre. 
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From 1952 successive British governments used hire purchase (HP) restrictions and 
Purchase Tax on consumer durables as key instruments of consumer demand management.i 
During the 1950s and early 1960s policy interventions were particularly severe, with the 
periodic imposition of tight HP controls and Purchase Tax rates of up to 66.67 per cent. These 
had reinforcing impacts, principally through raising the upfront ‘price’ facing the credit 
purchaser (the minimum HP deposit payment) – and were regarded by policy-makers as close 
substitutes.ii 
  While sometimes presented as an instrument of employment stabilisation, a key driver 
of demand management policy during this period was an over-riding priority among an 
influential section of policy-makers to restore sterling as a ‘strong’ currency (second only to 
the dollar) and re-establish the City as a major financial and trading centre, despite heavy war-
time debts and low currency reserves. There has been substantial debate regarding whether this 
prioritisation of external stability over internal stability had a detrimental impact on British 
economic growth and industrial output.iii  We focus more narrowly on the impact of stop-go 
on those industries primarily impacted by the HP and Purchase Tax restrictions – motor 
vehicles and household durables.  
Although they represented only about eight per cent of consumer expenditure by the 
early 1960s (and 12.0 per cent of 1963 manufacturing net output), consumer durables 
shouldered the main burden of consumption restrictions.iv As an official working party noted 
laconically, these controls operated on “such a narrow front [that] big changes in the controls 
have to be applied in order to produce the required change in demand. This produces great 
disturbances in the industries affected as well as great uncertainty.”v The Treasury and Bank 
of England viewed consumer durables as relatively low priority sectors, as their ratio of exports 
to total sales was lower than for the staple industries - reflecting protectionism and different 
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market requirements (such as alternative standards for mains voltages or television frequencies, 
or road conditions favouring higher horsepower cars).vi 
However, in other respects these were important sectors. Rapid household diffusion of 
consumer durables in most western nations, together with falling unit costs owing to rapid 
process innovations and scale economies, made them important growth industries.vii Even in 
Britain (where government systematically restricted their growth during ‘stop’ phases of the 
economic cycle), gross output in the electrical appliances sector rose from £72 million in 1954 
to £312 million in 1970; while gross output in motor vehicles expanded from £883 million to 
£3,306 million.viii Meanwhile the television and radio sector not only witnessed relatively rapid 
growth, but formed the bedrock of the wider electronics industry. Yet these characteristics also 
made them extremely vulnerable to unpredictable cuts in demand, which prevented plants from 
approaching full capacity and, in some sub-sectors subject to rapid product innovation, such as 
televisions, could lead to build-ups of excessive stocks that might become obsolete before the 
restrictions were lifted. 
 This article examines the extent to which stop-go policies contributed to the declining 
international competitiveness of these sectors. The first section outlines the evolution of 
government policy and the chronology of stop-go during the 1950s (which witnessed the 
greatest volatility in policy). We then examine contemporary evidence regarding the impacts 
of the restrictions, finding that they were widely perceived to have reduced potential scale 
economies; depressed both home and export sales; created a cycle of short-time working or 
lay-offs followed by systematic overtime, which eroded industrial relations; and produced a 
climate of extreme uncertainty that wreaked havoc with long-term production planning and 
investment. We look in more detail at the major new ‘consumer durables boom’ product of this 
era, televisions, to determine whether firms were seeking to serve post-war demand through 
mass production and whether the restrictions thwarted these efforts. Finally, we undertake a 
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quantitative analysis of the relationships between the policy restrictions and sales growth, for 
televisions and a representative high-ticket ‘labour saving’ durable, washing machines. 
I 
After 1951 Britain only suffered balance of payments deficits in two of the following ten years 
(1955 and 1960). However, the pursuit of policies designed to restore Britain’s international 
economic role, and the City’s status as a leading financial and trading centre, led to strong 
conflicts between domestic industrial growth and external stability. Restoring the City’s 
international status was perceived to require the resumption of sterling as a strong convertible 
currency with a major international role, an openness to capital inflows (including ‘hot 
money’), substantial outward investment in the sterling area, and efforts to maintain Britain’s 
great power status through historically high peacetime levels of defence expenditure (reflected 
in persistent public sector current account deficits).ix Given its low currency reserves, these 
policies made Britain particularly vulnerable to sterling crises (which, in practice, limited the 
extent to which they could be realised).x Maintaining confidence in sterling under these 
conditions was deemed to require periodic ‘credit squeezes’ to dampen inflationary pressures 
and demonstrate Britain’s prioritisation of external stability over domestic needs.xi  
 Squeezing consumer spending was achieved principally through restricting HP terms 
on consumer durables and raising their Purchase Tax rates. Purchase Tax had been introduced 
in 1940 as a war-time sales tax, for revenue and resource control purposes. On administrative 
convenience and cost grounds it was levied at the wholesale, rather than retail, stage. Purchase 
Tax became increasingly focused on consumer durables during the War period and the post-
war austerity era and remained so thereafter.xii 
The Conservatives’ 1951 election campaign focused on Labour’s severe restrictions 
on consumption, promising an end to austerity.xiii Following their victory the proportion of 
consumer expenditure subject to overt rationing fell from 10 per cent in 1951 to 2 per cent in 
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1955.xiv However, the use of less obvious means of ‘rationing’ (through the price 
mechanism), such as HP restrictions and Purchase Tax, intensified. At a January 1952 
meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers the new government included HP restrictions 
among a package of proposals aimed at stemming the loss of Britain’s dollar reserves. These 
restrictions were introduced in the 1952 budget.xv Labour had already raised Purchase Tax on 
consumer durables from 33 1/3 to 66 2/3 per cent in the 1951 budget, to divert resources to 
defence and exports.xvi The HP restrictions thus accentuated the increased pressure on these 
sectors. The Chancellor, Rab Butler, justified them as a means of saving scarce resources, but 
added that, ‘hire purchase… is essentially a form of living beyond one’s means.’xvii However, 
prudential arguments for HP terms control (to protect either the debt burden on consumers or 
the solvency of HP finance houses) did not feature in the deliberations preceding this, or 
subsequent, HP restrictions. When this issue was addressed, by an Inter-Departmental Group 
in December 1959, it was concluded that no convincing prudential case could be made for 
terms control.xviii 
Minimum down-payments of one third of the purchase price and maximum contract 
lengths of 18 months were imposed for a variety of goods including radios, household durables, 
and motor cycles.  Automobiles required a similar minimum deposit, but with 30 months to 
pay, while bicycles had a 25 per cent minimum down-payment and a 12 month minimum 
term.xix This set the broad parameters of HP controls for the rest of the decade – largely on the 
basis of redundant Korean War defence considerations. As a 1954 Treasury memorandum 
noted, “the list of goods at present controlled has been arrived at rather by historical accident… 
the supply position of metals and other scarce raw materials; it is doubtful whether the list in 
its present form really includes the right goods for the purposes of controlling consumers’ 
expenditure.”xx 
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The Bank of England (with some support from the Treasury’s Overseas Finance 
Division) regarded HP restrictions and Purchase Tax as a particularly useful tools of 
‘financial repression’ to cut consumer demand at any given interest rate. They formed part of 
a panoply of measures designed to restrict domestic credit and consumption, including 
controls on new capital issues and various measures to restrict bank lending.xxi These assisted 
a policy of sterling liberalisation, that required domestic demand to be periodically depressed 
in order to avoid runs on sterling - given Britain’s large overseas sterling balances, in 
conjunction with high levels of capital outflow and overseas government expenditure.xxii This 
was bluntly summarised in a July 1952 note from the Bank of England Governor, Cameron 
Cobbold, to the Chancellor, Rab Butler:  ‘responsibility for sterling lies with the 
Government… HMG must demonstrate that they are resolved to do whatever is necessary to 
discharge that responsibility. They can only demonstrate that by action taken at home where 
sterling has its foundations.’xxiii 
The Bank proved successful in pushing this agenda. Indeed it was so confident that the 
burden of any pressure on sterling would be addressed through depressing domestic demand 
that, without international support, it moved to substantially liberalise controls on the 
transferability of external sterling holdings in March 1954, while also re-opening the London 
gold market; paving the way for de facto current account convertibility from February 1955.xxiv 
By May 1954 the Treasury accepted that they had no legitimate defence or supply grounds for 
restricting domestic sales of consumer durables, but justified restriction as an administratively 
easy and effective means of depressing consumer demand, while also emphasising the revenue 
generated from high Purchase Tax rates.xxv Meanwhile evidence of damaging impacts on the 
consumer durables sectors was routinely brushed aside. For example, a March 1953 Treasury 
memorandum noted that most of these industries had a strong case for relief, but added: 
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On the other hand, reduction of the Purchase tax on passenger cars from 66 2/3% to 33 
1/3 per cent would almost certainly have to be accompanied by concessions on domestic 
appliances, which have been much harder hit, and possibly also on radio and television 
as well. All of this would add up to a considerable sum…xxvi 
 
As a result, these sectors continued to bear the brunt of the Purchase Tax burden. Furniture, 
domestic appliances, audio-visual equipment, and road vehicles, raised £270.8 million (gross) 
in 1958, representing 54 per cent of the total Purchase Tax yield.xxvii 
 HP regulations were suspended in July 1954, but reintroduced in February 1955. They 
were then tightened substantially in July 1955 and again in February 1956, in an effort to quell 
inflationary pressures - reinforced by an expansionary budget on the eve of the 1955 
election.xxviii Controls were also extended to furniture, which had hitherto typically been sold 
on very long HP contracts, with extremely low minimum deposits. This had a dramatic impact, 
furniture sales falling by some 50 per cent between the second and third quarters of 1954 and 
the same period in 1955.xxix  
A 1957 working party of economists drawn from the members of the Federation of 
British Industries [FBI] concluded that HP restrictions had been mis-timed, being lifted in 1954 
when a HP boom was already developing, then tightened in 1956, when the market was already 
showing signs of contraction. They also hypothesised that HP restrictions might “bunch” 
groups of HP customers together, in a way that would accentuate market volatility (by, for 
example, creating a large supressed demand).xxx These problems persisted. On 15th September 
1958, with sterling strong and recession looming, HP controls were relaxed. Then on October 
29th 1958 all HP restrictions were abolished.  HP finance houses and retailers responded by 
reducing minimum deposit requirements and extending contract periods, releasing 
considerable pent-up demand, with some retailers running out of stock.xxxi 
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However, liberalisation was short-lived. The Chancellor had responded to rising 
unemployment and a strong balance of payments in 1959 by what proved to be a recklessly 
expansionist budget that (like many economic adjustments of the period) came too late in the 
economic cycle to have the desired impact.xxxii In consequence HP controls were re-imposed 
at the end of April 1960. Between the third quarters of 1959 and 1960 new consumer instalment 
credit for durable goods fell from £194 million to only £140 million.xxxiii Even the Treasury 
(which typically sought to downplay adverse impacts) privately acknowledged that, ‘The 
situation is potentially a serious one. On the assumptions that retail sales remain around their 
present level (allowing for seasonal variations) and that between now and August 1961 stocks 
are reduced to the level existing in August 1958… production in the next twelve months would 
be at a rate 40-50% lower than the levels to which it had been reduced in July and August.’xxxiv 
In May 1960 the Board of Trade estimated that a reduction in HP debt of £115 million 
(compared to its March 1960 value of £920 million) would be consistent with a contraction of 
sales for consumer durables (excluding cars, which were partially protected in the short-term 
by the use of trade-ins for deposits) of around 70 per cent.xxxv  
HP and Purchase Tax continued to be used for macroeconomic stabilisation during the 
1960s, though fluctuations in controls were generally less dramatic. For example, while 
minimum HP deposits for cars had varied between zero and 50 per cent during the 1950s, from 
April 1960 to June 1966 they varied only between 20 and 25 per cent.xxxvi 
 
II 
Consumer durables manufacturers and retailers resented what they saw as the arbitrary 
designation of their sectors for demand management, but were particularly aggrieved by the 
sudden and unanticipated changes to HP restrictions and Purchase Tax rates, that played havoc 
with production schedules. Officials were aware that these sectors were particularly reliant on 
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mass production to lower unit costs and sustain international competitiveness. As a Board of 
Trade paper noted, consumer credit was vital to this strategy: “The high technical efficiency of 
the United States… in… motor cars, refrigerators, and other domestic appliances could 
probably not have been achieved so rapidly without the aid of hire purchase…”xxxvii 
However, such arguments cut no ice with policy-makers who subordinated the needs 
of domestic industry to their major long-term aims of defending sterling and restoring Britain 
to its former status as a leading financial and trading nation. The consumer durables’ sectors 
thus persistently failed to secure a stable tax and HP regulation framework suitable for mass 
production, or even long-term planning. As a June 1960 FBI memorandum noted, ‘production 
over the past decade in the domestic appliance industry, which is particularly vulnerable to 
such [credit restriction] measures, presents a bewildering pattern, reflecting the violent changes 
in demand… with slumps following booms in seemingly endless rotation… Artificial booms… 
created by the release of pent-up demand, are as much to be deplored as slumps.’xxxviii 
As Wray noted, the 1955 and 1956 credit control measures had curtailed production 
only at the cost of considerable difficulties for the firms concerned, ‘who have been left to meet 
the problem of adjusting their labour forces, production schedules, stocks of raw materials and 
components, and forward commitments, to a sudden contraction in their markets.’xxxix 
Government officials also privately acknowledged this. A 1963 working party on HP controls 
noted that when controls were lifted production could not be expanded quickly enough to meet 
pent-up demand, leading to a boom in imports. Conversely, additions to capacity to meet rising 
demand could prove worthless following their unanticipated re-imposition.xl Instability in 
demand was also said to have reduced scale economies, by deterring investment and fostering 
a bias towards labour-intensive production methods, which were more flexible to violent and 
unanticipated demand fluctuations.xli 
10 
 
One notable victim of the various credit squeezes was the motor vehicle industry, which 
accounted for almost one million workers in 1960 (including components, garage, and repair 
servicing), around 5 per cent of industrial production, and 16 per cent of UK visible exports.xlii 
In addition to very strict HP controls compared to overseas producers, 60 per cent Purchase 
Tax on the wholesale price of cars (equivalent to around 50 per cent of the retail price) was far 
higher than the sales taxes on cars imposed by the major European car-producing nations in 
1957 (6 per cent in Germany; 7 per cent in Italy; and 24 per cent in France), while the burden 
of other car taxes was also high by international standards.xliii  
In September 1952 the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders [SMMT] had 
reported to government that the industry was working at only 60 per cent of capacity as a result 
of the HP restrictions and Purchase Tax hike, resulting in redundancies and widespread short-
time working.xliv Treasury officials disputed whether industry sales were below the level 
required for the home market, but did so using rather extreme assumptions (one analysis 
assumed a static national stock of cars at pre-war levels and an average vehicle lifetime of 15-
20 years – compared to the eight year lifespan commonly assumed in the 1930s).xlv  
The 1955-56 HP restrictions also had a severe impact on this sector. By early March 
1956 several major producers had introduced short-time work, affecting some 20,000 
employees.xlvi Car manufacturers pressed for a reduction in Purchase Tax – as this had a more 
immediate impact on the new car market (where trade-ins often covered deposits). In 1957 
Ford estimated that home sales of British cars were around 25 per cent less (and overall 
production 14 per cent less) owing to Purchase Tax – sufficient to increase British unit 
production costs by at least 10 per cent.xlvii 
The 1960 HP restrictions produced another severe downturn. Car production fell from 
405,000 units in the second quarter to 243,000 in the fourth quarter, while home demand 
declined from 247,500 to 139,000, with widespread short-time working by the end of the 
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year.xlviii However, government made it clear that credit controls and Purchase Tax would be 
eased only when justified by the general economic situation.xlix Representations by the SMMT 
again emphasised the burden of 50 per cent Purchase Tax, claiming that progressive reductions 
to 16 per cent by 1963 would reduce unit costs by 7-10 per cent (a major saving, relative to the 
small margins on which cars were sold) and increase the industry’s employment by more than 
a quarter.l Similar problems were evident for other consumer durables. In September 1960 the 
FBI’s Director-General informed the Board of Trade that HP controls had disrupted production 
schedules and raised unit costs, domestic sales of leading household appliance manufacturers 
having fallen by as much of 30-40 per cent.li Tariff protection cushioned the industry from the 
full competitive impacts of the higher production costs imposed by periodic squeezes on their 
domestic sales - though their cumulative productivity impacts left firms extremely vulnerable 
to any initiatives, such as EFTA or EEC membership, that might remove this protection.lii 
Consumer durables manufacturers traditionally encouraged dealers to hold significant 
stocks, to smooth seasonal demand fluctuations and aid production planning. However, 
changes in HP regulations or Purchase Tax rates threatened to slash the value of dealers’ stocks. 
Retailers thus increasingly adopted a lean, ‘just in time’, approach to ordering, rather than 
working cooperatively with manufacturers.liii Whitehall made little effort to ameliorate their 
difficulties. For example, despite initial assurances that a mechanism would be devised for 
refunding Purchase Tax to retailers with stocks that had been charged higher tax when 
conveyed to them, officials failed to do so, claiming that it had not proved possible to find an 
administratively convenient and fraud-proof means, while repeatedly rejecting any 
mechanisms proposed by retailers.liv   
One standard Treasury response to industry complaints involved exhortations to focus 
on exports. In fact, HP restrictions were widely regarded as acting to depress exports and 
(during boom phases of the stop-go cycle) encourage imports. Domestic producers lacked the 
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capacity to meet the sudden surges in demand when controls were eased. For example, the 
removal of HP restrictions in 1958 led to a boom that overshot the capacity of domestic 
producers and precipitated a surge in imports of domestic appliances, which rose in value by 
82 per cent over the year following liberalisation. By summer 1960 imports of these goods 
stood at some eight times the level of 1955.lv Similar impacts were identified for Purchase Tax; 
for example, in 1954 Soloway concluded that its use to switch sales from home to export 
markets had depressed output below cost-effective mass production levels.lvi A Board of Trade 
study also found that contracting home demand depressed exports – by increasing unit costs 
and slowing new model development.lvii  
HP restrictions and Purchase Tax also distorted home demand in favour of lower model 
standards, often unsuitable for export markets. For example, these were said to have delayed 
the acceptance of the more expensive 21 inch screen TV format in Britain during the late 1950s, 
whereas in the USA and Europe 21 inch and larger screens were standard. Pressure to provide 
lower-cost sets also led British manufacturers to produce models of less attractive cosmetic 
design and fewer “features” than were demanded in major overseas markets.lviii 
Despite this evidence, Treasury officials took comfort in the buoyant state of national 
employment.lix However, within the affected industries the restrictions were having substantial 
negative impacts on employment, labour productivity, and labour relations. As noted above, 
‘stop’ phases saw major contractions in employment. For example, employment in furniture 
and upholstery fell from 142,000 in 1954 to 125,700 by April 1958.lx Moreover, in the domestic 
appliances and motor vehicle sectors unemployment was partially disguised by hoarding 
skilled labour.lxi Then in boom phases firms were often forced to rely extensively on overtime 
to meet orders, given their depressed capacity. As a 1960 FBI memorandum noted, when 
controls were eased the resulting spikes in production fostered, ‘exceptionally high earnings 
accentuated by incentives and overtime which… inculcates a sense of false values and creates 
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a most difficult situation when earnings are subsequently depressed… it is virtually impossible 
to maintain good relations, sound incentive schemes, or to organise satisfactory training and 
promotion if the company is forced by violent changes in demand to a policy of “hire and 
fire”.lxii  
Historical studies corroborate claims that stop-go was an important factor fostering 
labour militancy.lxiii This is also corroborated by official data on ‘substantial’ strikes, each 
involving more than 5,000 working days. The peak years for automobile strikes attributed to 
redundancies or short-time working (1953, 239,000 working days, one strike commencing 
February; 1956, 241,000 working days, three strikes, one commencing late April and two in 
July); and 1960, 66,800 working days, six strikes commencing between March and December), 
coincide strongly with the peaks of the three credit squeezes. Meanwhile annual working-days 
lost through strikes attributed to redundancies/short-time averaged only 23,667 over 1950-52, 
zero over 1954-55, and 1,867 over 1957-59).lxiv 
Analysis of the impact of stop-go on relative productivity must account for national 
differences in product characteristics, such as car sizes. Again, data are largely restricted to 
cars. Britain was transformed from having the highest automobile productivity in Europe (and 
second only to the USA) in 1955 to ranking below West Germany, Italy, and France by 1965, 
with Britain’s relative productivity continuing to decline over the next decade. This was 
accompanied by slower output growth after 1955, relative to Britain’s European competitors.lxv 
The declining competitiveness of Britain’s motor vehicle industry (which also includes factors 
not captured in productivity measures, such as poor styling or reliability) is also reflected in a 
sharp fall in its share of world trade in cars over the 1950s and 1960s.lxvi 
Britain’s declining relative productivity in automobiles is, in turn, linked to its 
progressive failure to achieve minimum efficient scale of output (estimated, at the firm level, 
to have risen rapidly from 150,000 units in 1947 to 750,000 in 1960, driven by rapid process 
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innovation).lxvii Unanticipated cuts in home demand were particularly damaging, by restricting 
output far below capacity levels, with substantial impacts on production costs.lxviii  This is 
corroborated by research showing that the volatility of British automobile production was 
markedly higher than that for major European producers, especially in relation to the industry’s 
growth rate.lxix 
Demand restrictions also impacted heavily on consumers, especially working-class 
households. It was estimated in 1959 that British consumer HP debt amounted to around £12 
per capita, a much lower figure than in the USA (£49), Australia (£32) or Canada (£33).lxx This 
translated into an unusually low diffusion of consumer durables (given Britain’s high per capita 
incomes). For example, in 1957 less than 10 per cent of British homes had refrigerators, 
compared to 12 per cent in France, 14 per cent in West Germany, 25 per cent in Denmark, 26 
per cent in New Zealand and 50 per cent or more in Sweden, Australia, Canada, and the USA.lxxi 
Officials privately recognised that HP restrictions were discriminatory in that they mainly 
targeted working-class customers, ‘suddenly making it more difficult for poor people to obtain 
goods… when the same goods were readily available to people able to pay cash’, or to white 
collar workers with access to bank loans or department store accounts.lxxii  
 
III 
To explore these impacts in more detail, this section focuses on a particular product 
class. Televisions are chosen as they were a high priority durable; lacked a significant trade-in 
market to cover deposits (owing to short lifespans and rapid technical obsolescence, driven by 
rising screen sizes) unlike, for example, motor vehicles; and were an expensive item throughout 
this period, with all models priced well above the normal ceiling for cash purchases. However, 
they were typical of household durables in terms of their HP restrictions and Purchase Tax 
rates.  
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Britain had been a leading television pioneer, with the world’s first regular high 
definition television service, from 1936. Surviving firm-level evidence indicates that during 
the early post-war years leading manufacturers were committed to mass production. For 
example, Ferranti adopted a mass production strategy after comparing current production costs 
with American data on unit costs at higher production levels (see Table 1). This involved 
setting prices at initially loss-making levels, to achieve long production runs and, therefore, 
scale economies in what was anticipated to be a rapidly expanding market.lxxiii EMI followed 
a similar strategy, launching a project to produce the cheapest TV set on the market (to sell at 
£45, inclusive of current Purchase Tax) in 1948.  This would involve a production cost of £15, 
which was believed possible only on a production run of at least 100,000. However, owing to 
the government restrictions EMI repeatedly found itself left with obsolete stock of each 
production run, which it had been unable to sell before the next generation of models became 
available.lxxiv 
[Table 1 near here] 
The imposition of a one third minimum deposit and 18 months maximum HP contract 
term in the 1952 budget substantially narrowed the market for televisions, given that the 
cheapest cost around £60, including Purchase Tax, (equivalent to almost seven weeks’ earnings 
for average male industrial workers aged 21 or over).lxxv The Chancellor had recommended 
that during 1952 the value of radio and TV output should be cut by 25 per cent – to redeploy 
production capacity to defence needs. However, the HP restrictions produced an output 
reduction of about 40 per cent compared to the previous year, while even a 25 per cent reduction 
was estimated to inflate unit costs by 7.5-10 per cent.lxxvi 
Following the 1953 Purchase Tax reduction a new ‘go’ phase ensued, with demand 
exceeding capacity and shortages developing (compounded by a shift of demand from 9 and 
12 inch screens to 14 and 15 inch sets which sold at the price charged for the smaller sets prior 
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to the Purchase Tax cut).  G.E.C. was rumoured to have 4,000 sets awaiting tubes and retailers 
reported having to wait 4-6 weeks for sets and considerably longer for tubes and repairs.lxxvii 
The growth in sales was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of TV’s sold on HP, 
from 45.1 per cent in July 1953 to 66.4 per cent in July 1954.lxxviii 
In the mid-1950s over 30 British TV brands were being marketed, by around 20 
different business groups (with independent design, production, and distribution facilities). The 
second half of the decade witnessed significant consolidation. Yet what could have been a 
beneficial process was undermined by financial crises among some of the largest and most 
dynamic firms – precipitated by ‘stop’ phases of the HP/Purchase Tax cycle.lxxix Some major 
manufacturers with broader interests made strategic decisions to quit the sector, to shield 
themselves from its instability. For example, in 1957 EMI ceased making receivers for the 
domestic market, with Ferguson taking over their brands.lxxx Another leading manufacturer, 
Pye, which was much more focused on televisions and radios, sought to develop subsidiaries 
outside this sector, to minimise the impacts of what its chief executive, C.O. Stanley, described 
as the “terrible peaks and dips” in sales.lxxxi 
Until the late 1950s television was a “growth” industry, with a substantial proportion 
of first-time buyers and demand boosted by extensions of the broadcasting day, the launch of 
ITV, the spread of transmission coverage, and the introduction of larger set formats. However, 
by the end of 1958 both the BBC and ITV had achieved virtually national coverage and around 
two thirds of British homes had sets. The onset of market ‘maturity’ was masked by a 
government-induced boom from November 1958 to the last quarter of 1959, arising from the 
removal of credit restrictions and a reduction in Purchase Tax from 60 to 50 per cent in the 
1959 budget. These measures boosted diffusion and accelerated the replacement of older small 
(9-15 inch screen) sets, designed for only one channel.lxxxii 
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Market saturation should have made it easier to predict demand and smooth production 
seasonality, using production planning, dealer ‘stocking’ schemes, and the introduction of new 
models during off-peak periods. However, such methods proved futile in the face of 
unanticipated changes in government restrictions.  In late 1959 manufacturers were aware that 
market saturation would produce a fall in demand and had planned output accordingly. 
However, the re-imposition of credit restrictions served to build up stocks before these lower 
production targets came into effect, forcing manufacturers to cut production to uneconomic 
levels. As a 1960 BREMA memorandum noted: ‘Production schedules… call for large-scale 
investment planned well ahead, and cannot be cut-back suddenly without very serious 
disruption… throughout the chain of supply…’lxxxiii The memorandum claimed that, unless 
government took immediate steps, the financial stability of manufacturers and distributors 
would be imperilled, undermining the industry’s ability to compete internationally.  
Over the year to 30th September 1960 manufacturers’ stocks of televisions rose from 
157,000 to 636,000.lxxxiv Total stocks (for manufacturers and dealers) at the end of August 1960 
were estimated at 1.2 million units, represented £23 million of capital at ex-factory prices for 
manufacturers stocks and £16 million at wholesale prices for dealers’ stocks (excluding 
Purchase Tax paid or due to be paid). The majority now represented the previous year’s models, 
thus depressing new model production.lxxxv 
This crisis marked a major watershed in the industry.lxxxvi One important casualty was 
Ekco, one of the largest British TV manufacturers, with an outstanding record for technical 
excellence and design success. Yet an accumulation of stocks during 1960 (accentuated by an 
unwillingness to ruthlessly cut back production) precipitated financial difficulties that marked 
its demise as an independent entity. As their Financial Controller noted, ‘the swing from a 
sellers to a buyers’ market almost overnight… [resulted] in grave over production by the 
industry and the group with consequent slashing of production and prices all round… Large 
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redundancies in factory personnel also played havoc with the factory situation….’lxxxvii Ekco 
was forced into a merger with Pye, while in the following year another major producer, Ultra, 
failed as a result of the squeeze (being acquired by Thorn).lxxxviii  
 
IV 
The literature on consumer durables distinguishes between ‘entertainment’ and ‘labour-
saving’ durables. Labour-saving durables are generally found to have much slower diffusion 
rates than entertainment durables (reflecting the lower priority households attach to them); 
together with slower product cycles and obsolescence.lxxxix In order to examine the extent to 
which HP restrictions and Purchase Tax changes impacted on UK sales across consumer 
durables, we look at the largest class of entertainment durables, televisions, and  a 
representative high-ticket household durable, washing machines. Most previous economic 
analysis of stop-go impacts on consumer durables has focused on the car market.xc However, 
impacts of HP restrictions are inherently much more difficult to model for cars than for 
televisions or white goods. In addition to a substantial business demand, most new private cars 
were purchased using bank loans, or by using the well-developed trade-in market to cover much 
or all of the deposit. Moreover, prior to 1955 shortages of supply for the home market created 
long waiting lists for new cars.xci 
 
 [Figure 1 near here] 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of monthly unit sales of televisions from January 1951 to 
December 1965 and maps the dates of changes in Purchase Tax rates and HP introductions, 
changes, and withdrawals. The data show both substantial seasonal variation and a clear trend 
in annual sales. Total, rather than HP, sales are chosen both for reasons of data availability and 
because we are principally interested in the impact of policy on affected industries, rather than 
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just on their HP trade. We examine both changes in minimum HP deposit requirements and 
maximum contract terms.xcii We further include the Purchase Tax rate and, from its introduction 
in February 1956, the ‘rental minimum down-payment’ (the number of months’ rental that had 
to be paid up-front for rented TV’s, a measure introduced to deter evasion of the HP 
restrictions). Estimates of the number of people who could receive a television signal are also 
included (separately for the BBC and ITV as, while ITV transmitters covered territories already 
served by the BBC, the launch of ITV is known to have boosted set diffusion).  
Unit sales in the current period, , are modelled as being determined by their prior 
values (  and ), the average price of a television in the two previous periods  
( ), quarterly cycle movements of the economy (measured by quarterly consumers’ 
expenditure in current market prices)xciii,  and , and the key variables of interest - the 
series of events listed above relating to changes in HP restrictions, taxes, transmission 
coverage, plus variables capturing annual trends - via a year trend and coverage  ( ), dummies 
for each month:
 
 
where is the error term.
  
Event dummies for introductions, changes, and removals of the three stop-go 
instruments –  HP restrictions (minimum deposits and maximum contract terms), changes in 
Purchase Tax rates; and rental minimum down payments - enable us to look at impacts in 
specific months. While the timings of Purchase Tax changes and HP restrictions do not 
regularly coincide, in half of the 12 instances where minimum HP deposits, or maximum 
contract terms, are adjusted, both are changed simultaneously. Changes in rental minimum 
down payments also mainly coincide with changes in maximum contract terms. 
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The results, shown in Table 2, examine the impact on changes in sales.xciv Eighteen 
stop-go event dates are highlighted. We follow Bain’s analysis of television diffusion in 
including a further event, the Queen’s coronation on June 2nd 1953, with a dummy variable that 
covers the three prior months.xcv There is also a Purchase Tax reduction in April 1953, but we 
cannot identify its impact due to the conflating effects of the coronation.   
The results provide consistent indications that tightening restrictions had substantial 
negative impacts on monthly television sales, while relaxing restrictions boosted sales. Seven 
of the eighteen stop-go interventions have well-determined impacts, while all remaining 
interventions, bar one, have impacts that could not be determined at conventional significance 
levels. The only intervention with a significant impact in the opposite direction to that predicted 
is the October 1955 Purchase Tax increase. This occurred in the month after the launch of ITV, 
which has a large and well-defined impact on sales (a 58.3% rise) and appears to have a 
continuing positive impact into October, conflating the impact of a relatively modest (10%) 
Purchase Tax rise. Impacts on sales values are considerable, ranging between a 32% reduction 
following the February 1956 restrictions and a 41% expansion following the removal of HP 
restrictions in July 1954. We also find a substantial impact for the coronation (29.2% for the 
three prior months). Both this and the strong coefficient for the ITV launch are consistent with 
earlier analysis of TV diffusion, by Bain.xcvi We test for unit roots using an augment Dickey 
Fuller test, including constant and trend components (given the data clearly has a trend). We 
are able to reject the hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Similarly, the 
Breusch-Godfrey test implies that we have no problems of serial correlation.xcvii  
[Table 2 near here] 
Of the two classic high-ticket labour-saving household durables of this era, washing 
machines and refrigerators, we selected electric washing machines for analysis. As Figure 2 
shows, washing machines displayed a broadly similar diffusion pattern to refrigerators, but 
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diffused somewhat faster (as refrigerators were an outlier among labour-saving durables in 
terms of their high purchase and running costs). Furthermore, unlike refrigerators, monthly unit 
sales data for electric washing machines are available for the full period of analysis. 
Unfortunately monthly data on the value of sales are not available until 1957, though annual 
data are available from 1954, enabling us to compose an annual price index. As sales and values 
are very highly correlated (99.5%) they provide close proxies in this case. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
We again include minimum HP deposit terms, maximum HP contract lengths, and 
Purchase Tax rates. Figure 3 shows the evolution of these variables and maps the dates of 
changes in Purchase Tax rates and HP introductions, changes, and withdrawals. While they are 
notably less variable than TV sales, there is nevertheless substantial seasonal variation and a 
clear trend in annual sales. 
    [Figure 3 near here] 
The findings, in Table 3, are qualitatively similar to those for televisions. All interventions 
show the expected sign, where significant.  The specification test provides no indication that 
the model suffers from unit roots or serial correlation. Our results thus indicate that HP and 
Purchase Tax changes impacted substantially on consumer demand for both entertainment 
and labour-saving durables, in line with official perceptions that the restrictions were having 
the desired effect. This is consistent with the literature for motor vehicles, which finds that 
the tightening of HP restrictions was associated with declining sales and that British output 
volatility exceeded that of other European countries.xcviii  
 
     [Table 3 near here] 
 
V 
22 
 
This study supports the view that there were strong continuities in the fundamental economic 
priorities of the Treasury and, particularly, the Bank of England, between the 1920s and 1950s, 
based around supporting sterling and the City.xcix Analysis of an extensive volume of Treasury, 
Bank of England, and other policy files indicates that the main driver of policy was the defence 
of sterling at its current exchange rate, with near-full employment viewed as a political 
constraint on this aim.c The underlying objective of this policy, restoring the City’s leading 
international role, proved successful. Yet, just as the long-term growth of the City and other 
sectors associated with Britain’s international role (such as oil and defence-related engineering) 
cannot be explained without taking account of their consistent prioritisation by government, 
the flip side of this policy – active discrimination against other sectors – should not be ignored 
in accounts of their decline.  
Financial retrenchment hit all manufacturing sectors, through periodic restrictions on 
bank lending and capital issues, though its impact was particularly severe on the consumer 
durables industries, that were forced to bear most of the burden of adjustment in consumer 
demand. We have shown not only that this policy inflicted severe direct damage on these 
industries, but that some problems commonly seen as root causes of their declining 
competitiveness – such as deteriorating industrial relations and failures to reach minimum 
efficient scale or maintain capacity output – were at least exacerbated by the restrictions.  
The Bank of England and Treasury had successfully pushed a policy that essentially 
involved favouring one group of sectors – associated with banking, finance, and international 
trade, at the expense of another – associated with manufacturing and, particularly, high ticket 
consumer durables. This had a number of long-term consequences for British economic 
development, boosting the growth of the City and the wider London area at the expense of 
Britain’s provincial regions and increasing Britain’s reliance on a relatively narrow base of 
internationally-orientated service industries. 
23 
 
 Our findings also qualify the depiction of the 1950s as an era of “affluence” for the 
working-classes. Formal rationing, which effected all sections of the population, was replaced 
by a less transparent system of credit rationing, that impacted most severely on those sections 
of society without bank or department store accounts. By limiting access to credit, government 
severely restricted the access of lower income families to some of the key status-related goods 
of the post-war era, such as cars, televisions and white goods, and effectively forced such 
households to bear much of the burden of financial retrenchment. 
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Table 1: Ferranti's estimates of costs and profits at various levels of TV output 
 
 
 
Source: Manchester Museum of Science and Industry Archives, 
Ferranti collection, 1996/10/1/7/409, notes regarding unit costs of 
television sets, 26th Feb. 1953 (with later notes added, 11th January 
1955). 
 
Notes: Data for 23,000 unit production based on production in the 1952 
calendar year. Figures for higher outputs based on American data. 
* Cathode ray tube figure for 1952 is not the actual cost incurred, but 
what the tubes could have been purchased for (more cheaply) from 
Mullard. 
** Data for 23,000 units includes a reserve of £15,000 for bad debts 
over and above £5,000 of bad debts actually incurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual production (units) 23,000 47,000 70,500 94,000
Costs/profits (as % of total revenue)
Materials:
    Cabinet 18.2 16.7 16.0 15.6
    Cathode Ray Tube* 14.2 13.5 13.1 12.8
    Other 29.2 28.0 27.2 26.7
Total 61.6 58.2 56.3 55.1
Other production costs 26.8 21.4 18.8 17.2
Sales & distribution** 19.6 15.7 13.7 12.6
Total costs 108.0 95.3 88.8 84.9
Profit/loss -8.0 4.7 11.2 15.1
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Table 2. Impacts of “Stop-Go” Policies on Sales of Televisions (January 1951 - December 
1965) 
 
 
 
Sources: Source: BREMA, UK Market. 
Notes: 1. Estimated using OLS. 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test estimated incorporates trend and a constant.  
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Table 3. Impacts of “Stop-Go” Policies on Sales of Electric Washing Machines (January 
1951 - December 1965)  
 
 
Sources: Modern Records Centre, Coventry; Mss 20/F3/E3/10/1, data provided to FBI by H.A. Furness, Hoover 
Ltd, 30th June 1960; Bank of England Archives, C40/725,  ‘Hire purchase and other instalment credit’, September 
1958, internal report, n.d., c. September 1958; UK, Inland Revenue, Reports of the Commissioners of Her 
Majesty’s Inland Revenue, years ending 31st March 1960–1966 (1960–1966).  
Notes: see table 2. 
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Appendix Table 1: Purchase tax rates and hire purchase /other credit regulations on 
televisions, 1946–1960 
Period Purchase 
tax (%)
HP controls
June 1948 - March 1951 33.33 None
April 1951 - Jan. 1952 66.67 None
Feb. 1952 - March 1953 66.67 33.3% deposit, maximum repayment period 18 months; or zero deposit, 
maximum repayment period nine months.
April  1953 - June 1954 50.00 33.3% deposit, maximum repayment period 18 months; or zero deposit, 
maximum repayment period nine months.
July 1954 - Jan. 1955 50.00 None
Feb. 1955 - June 1955 50.00 15% deposit, maximum 24 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months.
July 1955 - Sept. 1955 50.00 33.3% deposit, maximum 24 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
Oct. 1955 - Jan. 1956 60.00 33.3% deposit, maximum 24 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
Feb. 1956 - Aug. 1958 60.00 50% deposit, maximum 24 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months.
Sept. 1958 60.00 33.3% deposit, maximum 24 months, zero deposit, maximum 9 months
Oct. 1958 - March 1959 60.00 None
April 1959 - March 1960 50.00 None
April 1960 - Dec. 1960 50.00 20% deposit, maximum 24 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
Jan. 1961 - June 1961 50.00 20% deposit, maximum 36 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
July 1961 - March 1962 55.00 20% deposit, maximum 36 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
April  1962 - May 1962 45.00 20% deposit, maximum 36 months; zero deposit, maximum 9 months
June 1962 - Dec. 1962  45.00 10% deposit, maximum 36 months.
Jan. 1963 - May 1965 25.00 10% deposit, maximum 36 months.
June 1965 25.00 15% deposit, maximum 9 months.
July 1965 - Jan. 1966 25.00 15% deposit, maximum 30 months.
 
Source: see Figure 1. Notes: ‘Zero deposit’ terms refer to non-HP credit transactions. 
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Appendix Table 2: Purchase tax rates and hire purchase regulations on electric washing 
machines, 1951–1965 
 
Source: see Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period Purchase 
tax (%)
    HP controls
June 1948 - March 1951 33.33 None
April 1951 - Jan. 1952 66.67 None
Feb. 1952 - March 1953 66.67 33.3 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 18 months
April  1953 - June 1954 50.00 33.3 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 18 months
July 1954 -Jan. 1955 50.00 None
Feb. 1955 - June 1955 50.00 15 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
July 1955 - Sept. 1955 50.00 33.3 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
Oct. 1955 - Jan. 1956 60.00 33.3 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
Feb. 1956 - March 1958 60.00 50 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
April  1958 - August 1958 30.00 50 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
Sept. 1958 30.00 33.3 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 24 months
Oct. 1958 - March 1959 30.00 None
April 1959 - March 1960 25.00 None
April 1960 - Dec. 1960 25.00 20 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period24 months
Jan. 1961 - June 1961 25.00 20 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 36 months
July 1961 - March 1962 27.50 20 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 36 months
April  1962 - May 1962 25.00 20 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 36 months
June 1962 - May 1965 25.00 10 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 36 months
June 1965 25.00 15 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 36 months
July 1965 - Dec. 1965 25.00 15 per cent deposit, maximum repayment period 30 months
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Figure 1: Monthly unit sales of televisions, January 1951 to December 1965 (thousands) 
 
 
Sources: see Table 2. 
Notes: T = purchase tax; D = deposit rates; MP = Maximum repayment – the length of the period in months is provided in brackets. Arrow indicated increases and decreases 
in deposits, repayment periods and ‘–‘ indicates where there is no change. Details on each intervention are located in Appendix Table 1. 
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Figure 2: Diffusion of washing machines, refrigerators, and televisions (percentage of homes wired for electricity) in England & Wales, 1946-
1965 
 
Source: Bowden and Offer, ` technological revolution’, pp. 745-746. 
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Figure 3: Monthly unit sales of washing machines, January 1951 - December 1965 (thousands) 
 
Sources: see Table 3. Notes:  See Figure 1. 
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